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Abstract 
This working paper describes and explains the historical origins of the division between the national 
and the foreigner in South America. In the early nineteenth century, all the previously Spanish 
possessions in South America as well as Brazil achieved independence. With this new freedom, 
countries turned their attention to asserting their statehood through the delineation of three constitutive 
elements: government, territory and population. The new governments had to define who were going 
to be considered as nationals, citizens and foreigners, and the rights that pertained to each of these 
categories. These countries were all concerned with attracting new settlers and very early on 
introduced constitutional provisions on open borders and equal treatment for foreigners. White, male 
Europeans were the principal addresses of open borders provisions in an effort to entice them to settle 
in territories presented as empty to the exclusion of indigenous groups, bring new industries, and 
contribute to the whitening of mixed race populations. Whilst weak statehood came with 
independence, forming nations was a much longer process and States used migration and citizenship 
policies as tools to define nationhood. 
Keywords 
Citizenship, migration, South America, naturalisation, nation 
 
  1 
‘Of what benefit are the extensiveness, the richness, and geographical disposition of America 
to us; enslaved as we are? We have numerous and immense regions, unoccupied but by the 
inhabitants of the forest; but, you prevent man from entering them. If we cultivate the ground, 
you seize the principal part of the productions of our labour; and by shutting up our ports, you 
render the finest harbours, and the most extensive rivers in the world, nugatory or useless to 
us.’
1
 
 
Introduction* 
In the nineteenth century, open borders for people became a reality in South America, but this process 
was fraught with demographic, economic and racial implications.
2
 Open borders was primarily a 
civilising project in which the agents were to be white male productive Europeans. For the early 
legislators, the ideal migrant populated regions conceived of as empty, brought industries that were 
needed to participate in global markets and contributed to the whitening of mixed race populations. As 
in the United States of America (USA), loosening restrictions on human mobility was not a humanistic 
project but rather a utilitarian one. Nonetheless, there were striking differences with respect to the 
USA.
3
 For instance, South Americans generally abolished slavery much faster. They granted 
nationality to all those born in the territory – not only to free white persons – through ius soli. Equal 
civil rights were offered to foreigners, albeit with no political entitlements. Moreover, whilst they 
facilitated naturalisation without any racial discrimination, at least on paper, the offices accessible to 
naturalised individuals were more restricted. In contrast, the USA only prohibited access to the 
positions of President and Vice-President by those not born in the territory.  
Population was only one aspect of state formation and consolidation. With South American 
independence from Spain in the early nineteenth century, and in the case of Brazil from Portugal, the 
map of the region changed dramatically. This shift occurred with staggering speed between 1810 and 
1826.
4
 Newly free, these ten countries began to assert their statehood and seek nationhood by 
delineating three constitutive elements: government, territory and population. Whilst independence 
came with weak statehood, the process of forming nations represented a much more arduous struggle. 
                                                     
1
 W. Burke, South American Independence: Or, the Emancipation of South America, the Glory and Interest of 
England (London: J. Ridgway, 1807), p. 12.  
*
 The present working paper is mostly the result of work I conducted at the EUI as a Fernand Braudel Fellow between 
September and December 2015 and I would like to thank the Department of Law for support and for an excellent 
welcome during my period there. I would also like to thank numerous colleagues who have commented on previous 
versions of this work at presentations in South America, Europe and the USA, including: Rainer Bauböck, José Moya, 
Achilles Skordas, David Fitzgerald, Wojciech Sadurski, Jacopo Martire, Luisa Feline Freier, Matthew Brown, Marco 
Navas, Ana Santestevan and Ana Neyra. I would also like to thank Victoria Finn for her excellent editing and revision of 
the paper. The research leading to these results received funding from the European Research Council under the 
European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) / ERC Grant Agreement no. 340430 for the project 
Prospects for International Migration Governance (MIGPROSP) awarded to Professor Andrew Geddes, in which I 
participate as co-investigator. This working paper will be Chapter 2 of my forthcoming book to be published by 
Cambridge University Press in 2018 and provisionally entitled ‘The National vs the Foreigner in South America. 200 
years of Migration and Citizenship Law.’ 
2
 Mexico, Central America and later the Dominican Republic and Cuba in many respects opted for similar choices to those 
followed by the ten emerging South American States, and were also influenced by the Spanish 1812 Cádiz Constitution. 
They are not part of the discussion here for the simple reason that the book of which this working paper is Chapter 2 
deals exclusively with South America. In the 21st century the region has opted for new approaches to migration 
regulation, including regional free movement of people, which do not apply to Mexico, Central America, the Dominican 
Republic or Cuba. 
3
 On the USA, see: H. Motomura, Americans in Waiting. The Lost History of Immigration and Citizenship in the United 
States (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
4
 The remaining Dutch and British territories – present day Suriname and Guyana – only became independent in the 
twentieth century. French Guyana continues to be part of the French territory. 
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States used migration and citizenship policies as tools to define nationhood. In parallel, elites asserted 
and attempted to strengthen statehood in the name of their nascent nations.
5
 
A state was first required to possess a public authority in charge of ordering and directing internal 
and external affairs.
6
 This public or political authority was what Vattel labelled ‘sovereignty.’ 
Sovereignty was crucial in his view since only states that were independent and sovereign had rights 
and were subject to the law of nations.
7
 At the time Vattel was writing in the mid-eighteenth century, 
sovereignty resided with the monarch or prince.
8
 Thereafter sovereignty was transferred to the nation 
due to the French Revolution, the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the 1791 French 
Constitution. This model was also adopted in the 1812 Cádiz Constitution, which greatly influenced 
South American constitutional thought. To establish their sovereignty, the newly liberated countries 
rapidly embarked on signing various international bilateral agreements, thereby re-affirming their 
independence while attempting to achieve international recognition.
9
 
Second, with regard to territory, Simón Bolivar enunciated the principle of uti possidetis juris 
1810. The principle established that the new republics should adopt the colonial administrative units 
that were in place in 1810. This year was presented as the last one in which Spanish decrees were 
valid. Therefore, 1810 was used as the starting point from which to temporarily delimitate territorial 
lines.
10
 Even though this principle found its way into many constitutions and treaties, territorial 
disputes sometimes ended in conflict.
11
 Brazil independently rejected the principle; instead, in its 
bilateral delimitation agreements Brazil favoured uti possidetis de facto, by which territorial 
ownership was grounded on effective possession rather than colonial title.
12
 
Finally, there was the matter of population. The fledgling states had to define who they would 
consider to be nationals, citizens and foreigners, and the rights that pertained to each category. In each 
territory, the classifications would have consequences for the particular conception and construction of 
the nation, national sentiment and national identity. In other words, they needed to settle who was 
going to be admitted into the body of the polity, who would be entitled to rights and who would be 
subject to obligations.  
The purpose of this working paper is to investigate the four central elements that were at stake in 
legally constructing the national and the foreigner: original acquisition of nationality; the conditions 
under which nationals could become citizens in the sense of exercising full rights, including political 
ones; the requirements which foreigners needed to fulfil to obtain nationality, and their status once 
naturalised; and the rights of foreigners. In order to conduct this investigation, I rely on an analysis of 
the constitutions and citizenship and migration laws in all ten countries in the nineteenth century, as 
well as on secondary literature. This examination is important since there is robust historical 
                                                     
5
 M. A. Centeno and A. E. Ferraro, ‘Republics of the Possible: State Building in Latin America and Spain’ in Centeno and 
Ferraro (eds.), State and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain. Republics of the Possible (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), pp. 3-24. 
6
 E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (1758), Book 1, Chapter 1, §1. 
7
 Ibid., § 4. 
8
 Ibid., Book 1, Chapter 4. 
9
 As an example, see the various Peace, Friendship, Navigation and Commerce Conventions signed between Colombia and 
respectively the USA (Bogota, 3 October 1824), England (Bogota, 18 April 1825), Netherlands (London, 10 May 1829) 
and his Majesty the King of the French (Bogota, 14 November 1832). See also the Chile-USA Treaty of 12 October 
1834.  
10
 C. A. Parodi, Politics of South American Boundaries (Greenwood, Westport: Praeger, 2002), p. 5. 
11
 Ibid., pp. 1 and 5. As Parodi explains, of the twenty-five existent territorial borders in South America, eight were marked 
by major wars, eight by lesser ones and five by some level of violence. Some of these conflicts still affect regional 
politics, such as the dispute between Bolivia and Chile in the International Court of Justice. 
12
 B. García, The Amazon from an International Law Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 53-54.  
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continuity in the region in the relationship between citizenship, migration and the legal construction of 
the national and the foreigner, with recent debates often being nothing more than a modern expression 
of historical discussions. 
Birthright Citizenship in South America 
After independence, all the constitutions of the new republics without exception adopted ius soli as the 
automatic route to nationality upon birth in the territory. This choice has proven resilient: all ten 
countries still automatically award citizenship to persons born in their territory.
13
  
When the new constitutions were drafted, it was far from clear that ius soli would be the choice. At 
that time, ius sanguinis was much more prevalent both in theory and in practice. For example, Vattel 
argued that “natives, or natural-born citizens,” were “those born in the country, of parents who are 
citizens.” This was understood as a matter of self-preservation and perpetuation for society and the 
expected order of things, where “children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed 
to all their rights.” Vattel mentioned England as one of the few states where “the single circumstance 
of being born in the country naturalizes the children of a foreigner.”14 In contrast, France had included 
a form of ius soli in its 1791 constitution,
15
 but established ius sanguinis with its 1804 civil code.
16
 
Meanwhile, in the USA ius soli was only available to free white men until after the Civil War, when 
the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment extended it to African Americans.
17
 
Why did the new South American states opt for ius soli? Some authors argue that it was the result 
of an emphasis on “national territory rather than natural belonging or ethnicity.”18 Others cite the need 
to populate large territories, as reflected in the countries’ subsequent immigration traditions.19 Whilst 
such explanations help us understand why ius soli continues to apply after two centuries,
20
 they miss 
the point as to why the South American states originally enshrined this principle in their earlier 
constitutions. 
The Influence of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution 
The Spanish 1812 constitution played a crucial role in the legal construction of the national and the 
foreigner, serving as a model, various aspects of which the new republics and Brazil followed almost 
verbatim. The Cádiz Constitution, as the 1812 text is known, was one of the first national constitutions 
to achieve global influence with its advanced articulation of the traits a modern state should possess.
21
 
The particular circumstances in which it was drafted, with most Spanish territory occupied by 
                                                     
13
 This general rule is only partially breached in Colombia, where ius domicilii functions as an additional condition, by 
which one of the parents must be domiciled in the country at the moment of birth. 
14
 De Vattel, The Law of Nations, Book 1, Chapter 19, §212 and 214.  
15
 France, Article 2, The Constitution of the 1791 National Assembly, 3 September 1791. 
16
 France, 1804 French Civil Code, Book I, Title I, Chapter I, Of the Enjoyment and Privation of Civil Rights, § 9. 
17
 The recognition of Asians and Native Americans as citizens took even longer; see Motomura, Americans in Waiting, pp. 
72-73.  
18
 O. Vonk, Nationality Law in the Western Hemisphere: A Study of Grounds for Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship in the 
Americas and the Caribbean (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), p. 19. 
19
 Ibid., p. 9; R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1992), p. 33. 
20
 For instance, in the case of Colombia, where ius soli has no longer been automatic since its 1886 Constitution, Escobar 
presents low immigration levels as a possible explanation for this unique regulation in South America. C. Escobar 
‘Report on Citizenship Law: Colombia’, European University Institute, EUDO Citizenship, 2015, Florence, p. 16. 
21
 M. C. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions. The Constitution of Cádiz and its Legacy in Spanish America (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).  
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Napoleonic troops, contributed to a liberal product whose prestige soon extended to Europe and the 
Americas.
22
 The constitution was in force in large parts, although not all, of the pre-independent 
American territories.
23
 Importantly, the constitution was drafted by elected representatives from both 
the European part of Spain and the Americas, since 63 ‘Americans’ participated in the Cortes 
(representative body) legislative term between 1810 and 1813.
24
 The text was thus the most prominent 
document readily available when the newly independent countries drafted their own constitutions.
25
 
The Cádiz text clearly set out that the Spanish nation comprised Spaniards from both hemispheres 
and was free, independent and sovereign. A clear political project lay behind this ground-breaking and 
pluralistic vision of the nation. Beyond equality between the residents of the two continents, the 
central idea was to reconfigure the whole system by transforming the colonial into a homogeneous 
society, “united by common political and economic interests” and therefore capable of “facing a 
collective national destiny.”26  
This inclusive understanding of the nation incorporating Spaniards from both hemispheres as 
equals – from the motherland and its colonies – raised crucial membership questions. To begin with, 
who would actually be considered a Spaniard? It must be remembered that this was a constitution for a 
large empire, the future of which was far from secure since the French occupation of the peninsula in 
1808 spurred the hopes of several emancipatory movements. Creole elites despised centralism and the 
pre-eminence of peninsulares
27
 in official positions and were eager to liberalise economic trade.
28
 In 
this context, the American members of the Cádiz parliament advocated equality with those born in the 
peninsula. Any other prospect would have been unthinkable and rejected.
29
 Those born in the two 
hemispheres – including American Spaniards, who were descendants of peninsulares, also called 
Creoles – had to have equal status. 
The discussions rather revolved around the position of indigenous populations and those of African 
origin. This was not an ethical debate but instead was based on the political power of numbers. Each 
member of the Cortes was elected by 70,000 naturals
30
 and the American representatives were all too 
aware of this.
31
 To maintain their pre-eminence in Congress, the European Spanish representatives 
pleaded against the inclusion of indigenous and mestizo communities in the electoral census,
32
 arguing 
that they were backwards and easily manipulated by Creole ruling classes.
33
 This exclusion was 
rejected following opposition by the American group. However, when discussing the status of African 
descendants, the American block was split. Some Americans, such as the representative from Havana, 
                                                     
22
 J. A. Escudero López (ed.), Cortes y Constitución de Cádiz. 200 años (Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2011).  
23
 R. Gargarella, Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 17. 
24
 M. T. Berruezo, La Participación Americana en las Cortes de Cádiz. 1810-1814 (Madrid: Centro de Estudios 
Constitucionales, 1986), p. 3. 
25
 M. C. Mirow, Latin American Constitutions. The Constitution of Cádiz. 
26
 M. L. Rieu-Millan, Los Diputados Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas, 1990), p. 173. 
27
 The term peninsulares refers to Spaniards born in the European part of the Empire in the Iberian Peninsula.  
28
 Berruezo, La Participación Americana en las Cortes de Cádiz, p. 12. 
29
 This equality was already established by the Decree of 15 October 1810 on the equality of rights between Europeans and 
overseas Spaniards (Decreto sobre igualdad de derechos entre españoles europeos y ultramarinos). 
30
 Naturals, or natural-born individuals, included women and children in Europe, although they were not entitled to vote. In 
Spanish America, it did not include castas (any individual of African descent on either the maternal or paternal side). See 
Mirow, Latin American Constitutions, pp. 91 and 97-99. 
31
 See Arts. 29 and 31, 1812 Cádiz Constitution.  
32
 Mestizos were individuals of mixed race, especially the offspring of a Spaniard and an American Indian. 
33
 Rieu-Millan, Los Diputados Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz, p. 173; also see pp. 111-117. 
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disapproved of their inclusion, reflecting the prejudices of white oligarchies. The Europeans also 
resisted their incorporation not only because of the aforementioned representation issues, but also 
because of the fear aroused by the Saint-Domingue black slave revolution and Haiti’s subsequent 1804 
declaration of independence.
34
 The final compromise was an ad hoc status in which African 
descendants were considered part of the nation, but generally not citizens. This compromise – which 
was inclusive of the indigenous people and mestizos but excluded all those with any African ancestry
35
 
– meant the populations, and therefore the number of representatives, from the peninsula and the 
American provinces remained almost equivalent.
36
 Finally, the constitution did not truly address the 
position of slaves, although those who obtained their freedom were to be included as part of the nation 
and therefore as Spaniards.
37
 Political pragmatism meant that even those opposing slavery agreed to 
leave the issue untouched in order “to maintain union within the Spanish monarchy,”38 in line with the 
interests of American deputies representing regions highly dependent on slave labour, particularly 
Cuba. 
In conclusion, discussions regarding both indigenous peoples and African descendants related 
primarily to representational concerns rather than to ethical questions of inclusion or exclusion in the 
polity. An ongoing process of collective homogenisation was at stake, by which these groups were 
valued to the extent that they could serve the interests of both a new society and the reconfigured 
colonial system.
39
 The preference for ius soli and the distinction between nationals and citizens is best 
understood by considering this background. Civil rights and obligations were granted to all male 
nationals, to the full body of the nation comprising Spaniards from both hemispheres. On the other 
hand, the status of citizen, understood as a holder of political rights, remained confined to a smaller 
category of nationals, thus allowing for a gradual transformation of society rather than a radical 
rupture with the established order.
40
  
Ius Soli in the Constitutions of the New Republics and Brazil 
With independence, ius soli became enshrined in all the South American constitutions. It was granted 
to all freemen born in the territory, including both the indigenous and African descendant populations, 
but excluding slaves.
41
 Following what had occurred in Haiti,
42
 slavery was also soon abolished in 
most of the states as a result of the new constitutional order.
43
 Ius soli was not simply a consequence 
                                                     
34
 Ibid., pp. 146-168. 
35
 At the time the term that was used to refer to individuals of mixed white and black ancestry was ‘mulattos.’ 
36
 Rieu-Millan, Los Diputados Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz, p. 278. 
37
 Ibid., pp. 168-172. 
38
 M. C. Mirow, ‘Visions of Cádiz: The Constitution of 1812 in Historical and Constitutional Thought,’ Law, Politics and 
Society, 53 (2010), pp. 59-88, on 75-76. 
39
 Rieu-Millan, Los Diputados Americanos en las Cortes de Cádiz, p. 173. 
40
 H. Sabato, ‘On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America,’ American Historical Review, 106 (2001), pp. 
1290-1315. 
41
 This was different in the case of the USA since neither the indigenous nor African descent populations obtained 
nationality. See E. Román, Citizenship and Its Exclusions. A Classical, Constitutional, and Critical Race Critique (New 
York University Press, 2010). 
42
 On this, see A. Ferrer, ‘Haiti, Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,’ American Historical Review, 117 
(2012), pp. 40-66. 
43
 For Peru, see Article 11, 1823 Constitution; for Bolivia, Article 11(5), 1826 Constitution; for Argentina, Article 181, 
1826 Constitution; for Uruguay, Article 131, 1830 Constitution; for Chile, Article 132, 1833 Constitution; and for 
Paraguay, Article 25, 1870 Constitution. In the case of Colombia this only took place with its third Constitution, that of 
Nueva Granada in 1832, Article 5(6). In Ecuador, it occurred in 1851 by means of a decree. In Venezuela, it was 
abolished with the adoption of a decree on 24 March 1854. In Brazil, slavery was only abolished with the adoption of the 
Lei Áurea on 13 May 1888.  
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of the equality advocated by the American representatives in Cádiz. Instead, it was the best means to 
create “citizens out of colonial subjects” and to forge “national communities from colonial societies 
marked by stark social divisions.”44 Following the Cádiz model, sovereignty now resided in the 
nation.
45
 The elites eagerly proclaimed the end of racial discrimination and the integration of Indians 
and blacks as nationals.
46
 As San Martín, liberator of Peru, decreed in 1821, “in the future the 
aborigines shall not be called Indians or natives; they are children and citizens of Peru and they shall 
be known as Peruvians.”47 Ius soli was thus a principle well suited to new, still politically fragile, 
states that were in the process of national construction and assertion over their territories and 
populations, although blacks and Indians were discriminated against in various ways, as will be seen 
below. Moreover, ius soli was not only an inclusive enterprise but also served the purpose of rejecting 
those born in the peninsula, who could be expected to oppose independence.
48
 Thus, in chronological 
order, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile,
 
Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Paraguay 
adopted ius soli.
 49
 
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, Brazil’s first Constitution of 1824 was also similar to those of the 
former Spanish territories. It too adopted ius soli
50
 even though the 1822 Portuguese constitution, 
which had been in force in Brazil, only recognised ius sanguinis.
51
 The Cádiz constitution was well 
known in Brazil and had been adopted and published by decree by D. João VI in Rio de Janeiro – the 
then capital of the Kingdom – on 21 April 1821, although he decided to revoke it the following day.52 
                                                     
44
 N. P. Appelbaum, A. S. Macpherson and K. A. Rosemblatt, ‘Introduction. Racial Nations,’ in N. P. Appelbaum, A. S. 
Macpherson and K. Alejandra Rosemblatt (eds.), Race and Nation in Modern Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2003) pp. 1-31, p. 4. 
45
 1819 Venezuelan Constitution, Preamble, Article 3 and Title III, Section I, Article 2; 1821 Colombian Constitution, 
Articles 1-2; 1822 Chilean Constitution, Articles 1-2; 1823 Peruvian Constitution, Articles 1-3; 1824 Brazilian 
Constitution, Articles 1 and 12; 1826 Bolivian Constitution, Articles 1-2 and 8; 1826 Argentinian Constitution, Articles 
1-2 and 8; 1830 Uruguayan Constitution, Articles 1-4; 1830 Ecuadorian Constitution, Article 2. This is even clearer in the 
1835 Ecuadorian Constitution, Articles 1-2 and the 1870 Paraguayan Constitution, Articles 1-2. Some consider the 1844 
Paraguayan Political Administration law (Asunción, 16 March 1844) as the first country’s constitution. In this paper, we 
mostly refer to the 1870 Constitution since it is this second text which included all the provisions on access to citizenship, 
nationality and the rights of foreigners which had been absent in the 1844 document. In the Chilean case, provisional 
documents were adopted in 1812, 1814 and 1818. The first that can be considered a fully-fledged Constitution is the 1822 
document, which also had the adjective ‘provisional’ deleted from its title. 
46
 M. Loveman, National Colors. Racial Classification and the State in Latin America (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 
79-80. 
47
 Peru, Decree of August 27, 1821, cited in B. Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), pp. 49-50. 
48
 T. Schwarz, ‘Políticas de Inmigración en América Latina: El Extranjero Indeseable en las Normas Nacionales, de la 
Independencia hasta los Años de 1930,’ Procesos Revista Ecuatoriana de Historia, 36 (2012), pp. 39-72, p. 41. Certainly, 
reality during the wars of independence was much more complex since Indians, as well as slaves, sometimes “became 
allies of the Iberian forces simply because they were directly exploited by the criollos and they feared that independence 
would exacerbate their servitude.” J. Larrain, Identity and Modernity in Latin America (Cambridge: Polity 2000), p. 71. 
49
 Venezuela, Title III, Articles 1-4, 1819 Constitution. This is even clearer in Article 10(1) of the 1830 Venezuelan 
Constitution, promulgated after the separation from Gran Colombia; Colombia, Art. 4, 1821 Constitution; Chile, Art. 4, 
1822 Constitution; Peru, Art. 10, 1823 Constitution; Bolivia, Art. 11, 1826 Constitution; Argentina, Art. 4, 1826 
Constitution. This last constitution was short-lived and access to citizenship was not regulated in the 1853 Constitution 
but instead by an 1857 citizenship law which provided for territorial birthright citizenship (Argentina, Citizenship Law 
145, Buenos Aires, 7 October 1857); Uruguay, Art. 7, 1830 Constitution, Article 7; Ecuador, Art. 9, 1830 Constitution; 
Paraguay, Art. 35, 1870 Constitution. 
50
 Brazil, Art. 6, 1824 Constitution.  
51
 Portugal, Art. 21, 1822 Constitution. This was possibly a result of the influence of the 1804 French Civil code. 
52
 On this, see V. de Paulo Barreto and V. Pimentel Pereira, ‘¡Viva la Pepa!: A história não contada da Constitución 
española de 1812 em terras brasileiras’, Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Brasil, 452 (2011), pp. 201-223. 
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The 1812 constitution had also served as one of the models for the Portuguese text of 1822.
53
 Thus, ius 
soli was favoured, although it excluded slaves, who represented a quarter of Brazil’s population at the 
time of independence.
54
  
A peculiarity of the Brazilian case was that it included as part of the nation those who resided in 
Brazil when it became independent but who had been born in Portugal or in Portuguese possessions.
55
 
This was a product of Brazil’s independence settlement with Portugal, which was friendlier than those 
with Spain.
56
 Some of the new republics also considered both those loyal to the Creoles’ cause and 
resident in their territory nationals.
57
 Unlike in Brazil, this was worded in a general manner and not 
addressed to Spaniards in particular, although it was obvious that they would benefit the most.  
One final issue is worth mentioning. While ius soli prevailed, in a forward-looking legislative 
process ius sanguinis was not neglected. Access to nationality for those born outside the territory was 
included in the initial constitutions of all the ten new countries.
58
 In most cases, nationality was passed 
on by either parent. This is a remarkable early form of gender neutrality at a time when many 
nationality laws, including the Cádiz constitution, only applied ius sanguinis ex patre.
59
 It preceded a 
provision in the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women by more than a century.
60
  
Nationals and Citizens in the New Order 
Nationality and citizenship are sometimes used as synonyms. However, the word citizenship may have 
different meanings depending on whether it is formal – understood as membership of the state or 
nation – or substantive, interpreted as the possession of rights and duties.61 This conceptualisation of 
multiple forms of citizenship is apparent in the changing forms of electoral franchise with, for 
example, women being denied equal voting rights for decades.
62
  
The French Revolution, and its 1791 Constitution, introduced a crucial distinction between citoyens 
français and citoyens actifs. As Brubaker explains, ‘[t]hrough this distinction, the Constituent 
Assembly aimed to combine a universalist, egalitarian civil citizenship with a graded scheme of 
political citizenship.’63 This later developed into the orthodox distinction between nationality and 
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citizenship, the former indicating a legal bond between the state and the individual, and the latter 
adding political rights to that bond.
64
 Thus, under the classical definition of the components of 
citizenship as membership of a political community, rights and benefits deriving from that 
membership and, finally, political participation in the development of the community,
65
 the first two 
pertained to nationals, or citoyens, whereas the last one was only available to citizens or citoyens 
actifs. This division made its way into the Cádiz constitution. The question of who should enjoy 
political rights was fiercely battled over and later affected the new states in South America. 
The Influence of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution 
The Cádiz Constitution followed the then French tradition and distinguished between ‘Spaniards’ and 
‘Spanish citizens.’ Spaniards were all those freemen born and settled in the dominios de las Españas 
(literally the dominions of the various ‘Spains,’ thus comprising the Americas and the Philippines), as 
well as their offspring, thereby also including ius sanguinis ex patre for the first generation living 
abroad. This encompassed indigenous communities, mestizos and Spaniards with an African ancestry, 
but excluded women and slaves.
66
 Being a Spaniard – a national – carried the obligations to be loyal to 
the Constitution and the law, love the homeland, pay taxes and, most importantly, be conscripted.
67
 As 
a counterpart, it also brought the enjoyment of civil rights.
68
  
However, only citizens had access to municipal employment and to the political rights of 
representation and voting.
69
 Citizens were those Spaniards who resided in Spanish territory and were 
descendants (on both sides) from individuals from the Spanish dominions in either hemisphere.
70
 In 
other words, while nationality was mainly obtained through ius soli, citizenship involved ius 
sanguinis. The first people immediately excluded by this definition were those of ‘African blood,’ 
even if African descent was found several generations earlier. In the minds of colonial officials, “the 
‘stain’ of African origins (was) indelible.”71 These people were barred from exercising political rights, 
and were excluded from the calculation of the population size that formed the basis for proportional 
representation in a territory. The concept of African origin excluded all those who had any ‘mixed’ 
element in their ascending lines, whether they were peninsulares, Creoles or indigenous. Indeed, the 
representational base only included Spaniards originally from the Spanish territories in both lines of 
descent and foreigners who had become citizens.
72
 As previously argued, debates on membership, here 
understood as enjoying full political rights, were spurred by both ideological concerns and more 
immediate representational anxieties. European Spanish deputies feared that the addition of African 
descendants to the representational base would lead to American Creoles becoming masters of the 
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destiny of the monarchy, as the Americas were slightly more populous than the European part of 
Spain.
73
  
The distinction between civil rights, which were available to all freeborn male Spaniards regardless 
of their race or social origin, and political rights, which were only enjoyed by those who were 
“recognized as being intellectually capable of participating in the res publica,”74 made the 
enumeration of the circumstances under which the latter could be lost or suspended even more 
relevant. Citizenship was lost if one naturalised in another country or accepted employment from 
another government.
75
 Citizenship rights could be suspended if an individual was a bankrupted debtor, 
a domestic servant, had an unknown employment status or when there was a judicial interdiction due 
to moral or physical incapacity. A literacy requirement was supposed to be introduced in 1830 but it 
never was.
76
 The minimum age to exercise citizenship was set at 21 for voting and 25 for candidacy.
77
 
Women were always disqualified from being considered citizens. 
Thus, in contrast to nationality, citizenship was a much more limited privilege, from which several 
groups were excluded on the grounds of origin, gender, social background or wealth. It was also 
discriminatory on grounds of race. Freemen, who would mostly have been former black slaves, could 
become Spaniards if they had obtained their freedom within the territory. Thus, any free African 
descendant was immediately considered a Spaniard on birth in the territory and was capable of 
enjoying the same civil rights and carrying out the same duties as the rest of the nation. These people 
could also become citizens if Parliament granted them a citizenship charter under certain conditions, 
namely that they had performed services for the homeland, were distinguished by their talent, 
application and conduct, were born from legitimate wedlock, were married, resided in the territory and 
performed a profession, trade or useful industry with their own capital.
78
 In brief, to become a citizen, 
the African Spaniard needed to be a paragon of virtue. The ideal citizen was a prosperous independent 
active worker, was literate, free from ‘African blood’ and male. This representation also made its way 
into the Americas. 
Nationals and Citizens in the Constitutions of the New Republics and Brazil 
The same distinction between passive citizens – usually called nationals – and full citizens – labelled 
with terms such as sufragante, elector or ciudadano activo – was enshrined in all of the first South 
American constitutions, along with the various exclusions limiting access to full citizenship.
79
 The 
same was true regarding the duties and civil rights coupled with nationality, the political rights of 
citizens and the suspension and loss of citizenship. In chronological order, this was the case in 
Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Peru, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina,
 
Uruguay, Ecuador and Paraguay.
80
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The image of the ideal citizen closely followed what had been established in Cádiz. The qualities of 
the citizen were described in “racialized and gendered terms.”81 The holder of political rights had to be 
male, literate, married and individually autonomous, either through property, trade, capital or an 
independent profession. Only these men were “deemed to have ‘civic virtue’; only they were capable 
of self-government; and only they accrued equal rights.”82 This clearly excluded large segments of the 
population, most immediately women, unmarried people and those younger than the age of majority 
(usually 21 or 25). Criminals, the insane and debtors were also excluded. Finally, domestic servants 
and farm workers were not included either. Thus, whereas the nation was inclusively defined through 
ius soli, the political sphere remained reserved for a minority. Discrimination certainly did not end 
with independence.
83
 Whilst both indigenous communities and African descent populations were 
incorporated into the nation, their rights were often violated. When it came to political voice, Creole 
elites continued to hold sway.
84
 This understanding of the nation, with the white elite of European 
origin holding a dominant role, greatly influenced immigration and naturalisation policies.  
The Naturalisation of Foreigners 
With naturalisation, the rite of passage from foreigner to national citizen is, in principle, complete. The 
new citizen should in theory enjoy the same full political rights and equal treatment as those who 
acquired citizenship by birth. Today, naturalisation is mainly understood as a process by which the 
individual accesses further rights. Historically, military service or obligatory conscription worked as 
powerful deterrents against foreigners acquiring citizenship. Indeed, Napoleon himself preferred ius 
soli to ius sanguinis, as was finally adopted in the 1804 French civil code, since “he was more 
concerned with the military obligations that could be imposed on citizens than with the civil rights 
they would enjoy.”85 
Naturalisation in Spain has been regulated since at least the sixteenth century. Foreigners were 
forbidden from accessing and trading with the Americas, known as Las Indias.
86
 They only had two 
legal routes to joining the fruitful business taking place between the two continents: obtain a royal 
licence or naturalise.
87
 A third possible route was a sort of regularisation procedure for migrants who 
had illegally settled in the Americas. This was known as composición and entailed paying a sum of 
money. It allowed the individual to naturalise and rightfully remain in Las Indias. The Crown’s need 
of funds played a crucial role in the regulation. An early regularisation mechanism was the 1596 Royal 
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Decree, which was applied several times in the following decades.
88
 A few years later, in 1608, the 
requirements for naturalisation were set out in a royal decree, although other informal arrangements 
had already been in place.
89
 The number of naturalisations granted was always extremely low and 
reflected the zeal with which the Spanish Crown protected its monopoly on trading with the 
Americas.
90
 The Cádiz Constitution echoed these concerns.  
The Influence of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution 
There were four different categories of people in the Spanish Constitution of 1812: nationals, citizens, 
African descendants and foreigners, who could become Spaniards either by obtaining a naturalisation 
certificate from the Cortes or by residing in any town for ten years.
91
 Once naturalised, the new 
nationals could become citizens by obtaining a special citizenship certificate from Parliament. 
Thereafter, they enjoyed political rights and access to municipal jobs. To qualify for citizenship, 
marriage to a Spanish woman was required together with one of the following qualifications: having 
brought a significant invention or industry to the territory of the Españas; having acquired real estate 
for which direct taxes had been paid; having established commerce with the new national’s country of 
provenance; or having performed noteworthy services in the defence of the nation.
92
 These four routes 
– industry, property, commerce and important services – deeply influenced South America.  
There were two remarkable paradoxes. First, foreigners who had naturalised could access 
citizenship more easily than African Spaniards. Second, naturalised foreigners were nevertheless 
disqualified from occupying the highest offices in the three branches of government: executive, 
legislative and judicial. Naturalised citizens could not serve as members of Parliament, Secretaries of 
Office (ministers), judges or magistrates, or be part of the State Council.
93
 Therefore, the status of 
naturalised foreigner lay somewhere between the Spaniard and the Spanish citizen, but it was always 
ahead of the African Spaniard. Indeed, unlike the latter, they not only had an easier route towards full 
political rights but were also included in the population counts used to determine political 
representation in the two hemispheres.
94
  
Naturalisation of Foreigners in the Constitutions of the New Republics and Brazil 
As previously mentioned, members of the South American elite resented several aspects of their 
relationship with the colonial authorities: centralism, the pre-eminence of peninsulares in official 
positions and the impossibility of liberalising trade. A fourth resentment can be added. Many decades 
before the Argentinian Alberdi wrote his famous sentence “to govern is to populate,”95 other thinkers 
who were deeply influenced by English liberalism had already clarified the need to open borders for 
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the migration and settlement of Europeans to populate large extensions of territory. The Spanish 
position made this impossible unless independence were achieved. William Burke was possibly the 
first to clearly verbalise this. This obscure character, whose existence is questioned by some 
observers,
96
 wrote his works in England in 1807-1808 before moving to Caracas in 1810. Later, in 
1810 and 1811, several articles were published under his name in the Gazeta de Caracas. They were 
subsequently compiled in two volumes with the title Derechos de la América del Sur y México. These 
writings made a plea in favour of the arrival in South America of foreigners with capital, 
entrepreneurship, industry and useful knowledge in the sciences or arts. Attracting such migrants 
required the South American countries to provide them with as many advantages as possible, 
including immediate equal rights and naturalisation after residence of just three years.
97
 
Whether Burke really existed, or whether he was in reality a pseudonym for Francisco de 
Miranda,
98
 is irrelevant for our purposes. What matters here is the fervent plea in favour of open 
borders, which would lead to new towns becoming “the habitation of civilized men,” to increases in 
production, which would greatly alleviate “the wants and distresses of other countries” and, most 
importantly from the English point of view, to “new and numerous markets for the sale of European 
manufactures.”99 Burke set out a clear chain of events, which was mirrored in the minds of other early 
thinkers and independence leaders: migration by Europeans would lead to advancing civilization, 
which would lead to increased manufacturing and production through intensive farming and 
exploitation of vast territories, which would lead to economic growth through free trade with Europe. 
At the time, population was considered the “beginning of industry and the foundation of States’ 
happiness.”100 By today’s standards, the continent was scarcely populated,101 with an estimated nine 
million residing in the whole of Spanish South America.
102
 Many independence leaders – including 
not only Miranda, but also Bolivar, Andrés Bello and Bernardino Rivadavia, the first Argentinian 
President – spent time in London. There, these leaders befriended Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, 
fervent advocates of utilitarian, laissez faire and free trade liberal doctrines. These connections 
decisively influenced the thinking of early legislators, which was in stark opposition to the previous 
Spanish Crown’s monopoly on trading routes.103 
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Free movement and open border provisions rapidly made their way into the early laws and 
constitutions adopted by the South American governments. The 1811 Venezuelan Constitution 
introduced a novel clause, which all the countries in the region replicated sooner or later: “All 
foreigners of any nation will be admitted into the State.”104 The same article provided for equal 
treatment regarding personal property and security. Naturalisation was possible after seven years of 
residence.
105
 Also in 1811, the Act of Federation of the United Provinces of Nueva Granada
106
 
provided that asylum would be granted to all foreigners seeking peaceful domicile, as long as they 
respected the laws, brought healthy intentions and some useful industry and would for that purpose 
obtain a naturalisation certificate. Argentina followed suit by adopting a decree in 1812 offering its 
immediate protection to members of any nation and their families willing to fix their domicile in its 
territory.
107
 Finally, in 1813 Simón Bolivar invited all foreigners of any nation and profession to settle 
in Nueva Granada.
108
 These models exerted a profound influence on South American constitutionalism 
in the nineteenth century. In country after country, open border provisions and clauses announcing 
admittance for all foreigners with freedom, security and equal rights for themselves and their 
properties were enshrined among their supreme norms.
109
  
Open borders were coupled with equal treatment and naturalisation after short residence periods. 
These enticements targeted European migrants. It should be remembered that when Alberdi stated that 
to govern was to populate he saw such settlement as a means of civilization. As such, it was only to be 
performed by those he considered to be civilised; that is, by Europeans. Immigration by others deemed 
less virtuous – such as Ottomans, Indians, Chinese or Africans – was to be avoided.110 Even with this 
caveat in mind, the free movement of people represented a radical split from the previous colonial 
system and its restrictions. 
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Early on, South America started a race to attract permanent European settlers by means of 
numerous laws and policies. These included dispatching immigration propaganda agents to Europe
111
 
and the legally ratified provision of land, tax exemptions, free accommodation, assistance with finding 
jobs and internal transport to final destinations.
112
 The laws and decrees were either aimed at 
Europeans generally or to particular countries in the old continent.
113
 However, numerically speaking, 
these programmes were a failure as the numbers of arrivals never met expectations, which was a major 
headache for the national parliaments debating how to increase population sizes. Whilst ius soli 
ensured that the children of migrants would automatically become nationals, easier access to 
naturalisation was considered a way to promote the entrance of more industrious white settlers.
114
 
Sometimes this was automatic upon arrival
115
 or after only one year.
116
 In some countries, foreign 
residents were spontaneously declared nationals if they had resided in the territory since before 
independence or the adoption of the constitution
117
 and had registered as citizens.
118
 However, it was 
only in the late nineteenth century that foreigners, mainly southern Europeans, arrived in large 
numbers, and mostly to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. 
The requirements for naturalisation remained similar throughout the nineteenth century and 
followed the model adopted in the 1812 Cádiz Constitution. The South American countries were 
looking for virtuous foreigners. In the official narrative, virtue was essentially equated with 
independence of means. Generally, only four paths, corresponding to those in the 1812 Cádiz 
Constitution, could be followed to become a national: property, capital invested in trade or commerce, 
performance of an industry, science or art or outstanding services in favour of the state.
119
 Literacy 
was also necessary. Marriage was always understood as an element which, when not a sine qua non 
condition,
120
 reduced the period of residence required for access to nationality.
121
 Marriages contracted 
with nationals were further rewarded with shorter residence requirements.
122
 As Brown states, 
foreigners “who married Creole women became linked to the national family through affection and 
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love and through their children who were naturales of the patria.”123 This gendered narrative 
presented the perfect citizen as protecting “the sexual virtue of their women dependents.”124 The 
importance attached to marriage also reflected the Catholic Church’s exclusive power in this domain, 
since civil marriages only became a reality – and a strongly contested one – in the 1880s in countries 
like Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.
125
  
Thus, the South American elite expected the same qualities of an ideal citizen as of an ideal 
immigrant. From the very beginning, the vision was that of a married white European male with 
independent means. However, unlike in the USA, where only free white persons could naturalise until 
1870,
126
 race did not play such a central role in South American naturalisation laws, at least on paper. 
For example, even if Asians were not the main targets of immigration policies, they were explicitly 
invited to naturalise in Colombia in 1847 and in Venezuela in 1855.
127
 
In stark contrast, and in line with the Cádiz model, newly naturalised individuals were not 
considered worthy to exercise the highest mandates in the three branches of government. In other 
words, full legal equality was not extended to new nationals. This was the result of a dichotomy 
between open door policies and concerns over the loyalty of new subjects during a period when there 
was a looming threat of invasion by European powers.
128
 The members of the ruling elites also wanted 
to avoid direct competition for representative positions.
129
 Indeed, it was not uncommon during 
legislative debates for them to refer to the new nationals as ‘naturalised foreigners,’ a contradictory 
term in itself.
130
 Furthermore, prohibitions on migration during colonial times meant that local 
populations, and also the Catholic Church, were not accustomed to foreigners in general, let alone to 
those who were Protestants or Jews, who had previously kept a low profile or converted to 
Catholicism. Besides mercenaries who had fought in the independence wars, these early newcomers 
were mainly merchants. They often had their own established networks and were thus in a better 
position to take advantage of the transatlantic trade. This created resentment among local artisans, who 
suffered from the abundance of cheap imported foreign goods now available after the Spanish trade 
monopoly ended.
131
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Traditionally, the highest positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches were reserved 
for citizens by birth.
132
 In other cases, newly naturalised individuals had to wait a number of years 
before they could perform any of these functions.
133
 This still applies today in all 10 countries: with 
different degrees of restriction, they all limit access to the executive, legislature and judiciary, which 
may seem peculiar from a comparative perspective.  
The Rights of Foreigners 
According to Brubaker, the French Revolution produced the concept of ‘foreigner’ as a consequence 
of having invented the national citizen.
134
 The status of foreigners had, however, been the subject of 
much earlier regulation. For example, Vattel stated in the mid-eighteenth century that they enjoyed 
“only the advantages which the law or custom gives them.”135 In some respects, foreigners were 
clearly underprivileged, notably when it came to the droit d´aubaine and the droit de detraction, both 
of which were widespread practices in Europe until the nineteenth century.
136
  
The legal status of foreigners improved in Europe during the nineteenth century. They had, both in 
theory and often in practice, the right to equal enjoyment of certain civil rights. For example, in 1874 
the first session of the Institute of International Law in Geneva acknowledged that international law 
required the recognition of foreigners’ civil rights and the legal capacity to realise those rights. This 
was a duty of international justice, rather than being derived from bilateral treaties, and thus was 
independent of their existence.
137
 Foreigners were granted certain civil rights, such as protection of the 
freedom to contract, to own or transfer property, to access tribunals, to engage in trade and to acquire 
land.
138
 Despite the theoretical extension of civil rights, even in the period before the First World War, 
when passport controls became pervasive,
139
 individual foreign citizens could be deported for various 
reasons, including being “poor, sick, or perhaps because of a criminal offence, but also for direct 
political reasons, ‘in the public or national interest’.”140  
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The Influence of the 1812 Cádiz Constitution 
On the particular question of the rights of foreigners, the Cádiz Constitution remained by and large 
silent. The provisions on the right to property and individual liberty included all residents, be they 
nationals or not.
141
 Most rights, however, were exclusively reserved to Spaniards.
142
 Except in the 
context of routes toward nationality and, eventually, citizenship, there were few articles in which the 
word ‘foreigner’ appeared. As previously explained, even foreigners who had naturalised were 
excluded from holding certain elective positions. Foreigners were also forbidden from travelling to 
and trading with Las Indias. In the case of the peninsula, where several foreign merchants had settled 
– most notably in Seville and Cádiz – there was always the possibility of naturalising after a period of 
ten years, or earlier if the individual obtained a naturalisation certificate. The particular legal status of 
those who remained foreigners was the subject of a number of royal decrees, and was also part of 
bilateral arrangements with other European powers.
143
 
The Rights of Foreigners in the Constitutions of the New Republics and Brazil 
Foreigners were encouraged to migrate to the new territories with open border provisions, short 
residence requirements for naturalisation and the other benefits mentioned above. Their rights were 
also specifically integrated into many of the early constitutions, which often conferred: equal civil 
rights; the exercise of any industry, trade or profession; possession, purchase and sale of property; and, 
in some cases, freedom of religion.
144
 The rights of particular nationalities were also the subject of 
bilateral navigation and commercial agreements between the new countries and various European 
powers.
145
 Similar provisions on access to justice, personal property, freedom to trade or freedom of 
religion were incorporated into these treaties. 
Foreigners who did not naturalise also enjoyed two rights not available to nationals, namely 
exemption from military service and diplomatic protection by their respective countries. While the 
first prerogative created resentment among national populations, the second had more far-reaching and 
significant consequences. During the nineteenth century, both the USA and European powers 
frequently resorted to what has been labelled “arrogant diplomatic protection” in their relations with 
Latin America.
146
 This meant the practice of employing diplomatic means – or even using force – 
rather than normal procedural mechanisms before local tribunals when the foreigner was a US or 
European national residing in the region. These practices often interfered in the internal affairs of the 
newly established sovereign republics and Brazil.
147
  
According to the contemporary Argentinian scholar Carlos Calvo, these sorts of diplomatic claims 
were rejected when they were put forward between European powers since otherwise nationals would 
                                                     
141
 Art. 172, 1812 Cádiz Constitution. 
142
 See, for example, Arts. 247, 280, 287, 373, 1812 Cádiz Constitution.  
143
 J. M. González Beltrán, ‘Legislación sobre Extranjeros a finales del Siglo XVIII,’ Revista de Historia Moderna y 
Contemporánea, 8-9 (1997), 103-118.  
144
 Argentina, Art. 20, 1853 Constitution; Brazil, Art.72, 1891 Constitution; Bolivia, Art. 162, 1839 Constitution; Chile, Art. 
12, 1833 Constitution; Colombia, Art. 183, 1821 Constitution; Ecuador, Art. 107, 1835 Constitution; Paraguay, Art. 33, 
1870 Constitution; Peru, Art. 178, 1839 Constitution; Venezuela, Art. 218, 1830 Constitution. 
145
 See, for example, those between Colombia and the USA, 3 October 1824; Argentina and Great Britain, 2 February 1825; 
Brazil and Great Britain, 17 August 1827; Gran Colombia and the Netherlands, 10 May 1829; Colombia (Nueva 
Granada) and France, 28 October 1844; Peru and Belgium, 16 May 1850; Argentina and Prussia, 19 September 1857; and 
Venezuela and Italy, 20 September 1862. 
146
 R. Gómez Arnau, México y la Protección de sus Nacionales en Estados Unidos (México D.F: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1990), p. 35. 
147
 See examples of this in M. Offut, The Protection of Citizens Abroad by the Armed Forces of the United States 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1928). 
Diego Acosta 
18 Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Papers 
have had fewer rights than foreigners originating from dominant states.
148
 Thus, the 1868 Calvo 
Doctrine proposed two standards. On the one hand, it set out the need to exhaust local remedies and 
the impossibility of diplomatic claims unless justice had been denied at the national level. On the other 
hand, and as a corollary to the first principle, it established the equal treatment of both nationals and 
foreigners with regard to civil rights, including the protection of property and access to tribunals. 
These principles influenced several constitutions in the region and the adoption of various covenants at 
regional congresses.
149
 
Naturalisation rates were always extremely low. For example, by 1914 only 1.4 percent of all 
foreigners had naturalised in Argentina compared to 52 percent in the USA. Moya argues that this 
resulted from a lack of incentives to naturalise.
150
 Foreigners enjoyed most citizenship rights except 
the vote – and the value of this was dubious considering the largely oligarchical political systems that 
prevailed. In turn, they were exempted from military service and continued to enjoy diplomatic 
protection. The situation was rather different in the USA. For a start, the military draft included 
foreigners. Moreover, acquiring the right to vote could offer benefits that were more tangible in 
particular cities. Many municipal jobs, for example, required citizenship.
151
 Faced with similar low 
naturalisation rates, Brazil and Venezuela opted to naturalise their foreigners without their consent. 
These ‘great naturalisations’ led to serious condemnation and protests by the governments of the 
European countries of origin.
152
 
A final point must be re-emphasised. The desire to attract Europeans to settle in territories that 
were presented as being as empty as deserts
153
 was part of a demographic, economic, political and 
racial project. Whereas ius soli in principle considered those born in the territory to be members of the 
nation, some have seen this as an ideological device to flatten the cultural indigenous reality and to 
“negate the Indian as a space of difference” in, for example, Peru and Bolivia.154 Certainly, at the same 
time that indigenous peoples were being incorporated into the new national body, processes of internal 
‘othering’ portrayed them as enemies and savages, such as in the case of the Mapuches in Chile.155 In 
Rouquié’s words, “the elimination of the guarantees granted to Indians by the Spanish crown and the 
formally egalitarian spirit of liberalism that dominated the new republics opened the way for the 
breakup of Indian communities.”156 Through the expansion of the frontiers, native groups were either 
exterminated or forcefully assimilated in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. In Brazil and Colombia, the 
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prevailing understanding was that the only way to civilise the country was through a gradual 
replacement of natives with Europeans.
157
 As Rouquié eloquently puts it, “the mechanisms for the 
exclusion of those who are dominated are ambivalent and involve both together and separately the 
methods of obligatory cooptation and marginalization.”158 Open borders always represented a 
civilising utilitarian project, not a humanistic one. 
Discussion 
In a comparative perspective, the South American countries have both more restrictive and more open 
features than the USA, Europe and other regions. In one sense, they appear to be more open as they all 
have, like the USA, territorial birthright citizenship and short residence periods to access nationality. 
Moreover, recent legislative practice on migration has included more generous provisions with regard 
to extending equal rights to foreigners, including voting rights, enunciations of non-criminalisation, 
the right to migrate and open borders.
159
 Nonetheless, naturalised citizens face limitations on serving 
in the highest state offices. Furthermore, the
 
naturalisation requirements, beyond the length of 
residence, are often difficult to fulfil in practice and the procedures are cumbersome, so naturalisation 
rates remain strikingly low.
160
 
All these characteristics can be traced back to the particular circumstances of independence from 
Spain and Portugal. Indeed, the 1812 Cádiz Constitution was used as a model and it introduced many 
elements still present today, such as ius soli and limitations on naturalised nationals. By contrast, the 
context of post-colonial societies resulted in open borders, short-term residence periods before 
naturalisation and equal treatment of foreigners. Previous migration prohibitions applicable to non-
Spaniards led to open borders and the promise of equal treatment for residents and foreigners alike. To 
clarify, this was not an invitation to the entire world to emigrate to South America. Through 
constitutional law, the ruling Creole elites clearly delineated the image of the perfect citizen, matching 
that of the perfect migrant. He was portrayed as a white, male, married, autonomous and industrious 
European, or a European descendant. These gendered and racialised views were preserved for several 
decades. Opening borders did not derive from a humanist or cosmopolitan approach, but rather from a 
demographic racial project with the clear aim of populating large territories with white European 
settlers and, often in the process, eradicating indigenous communities. This was a state and nation-
building exercise in a period of transition from colonial societies into republics, where collective 
identities were far from settled and where the relationship with foreigners was vital in determining the 
boundaries of the polity.
161
 Two questions are pertinent here. First, how is it possible that so many new 
countries followed the same pattern? Second, and perhaps more importantly, how can we explain the 
persistence of both liberal and conservative elements through almost 200 years of constitutional 
practice?  
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Diffusion in South America´s Construction of the Foreigner and the National 
Many of the legislative choices regarding citizenship and migration that were adopted in South 
America originated from the influence of the Cádiz Constitution. Three reasons can be proposed for 
this. First, the Cádiz Constitution had been in place over large parts of the territories that later became 
independent countries.
162
 Second, numerous American deputies had participated in its drafting. Third, 
this Constitution carried enormous prestige in liberal circles and was influential not only in the 
Americas but also in Europe.
163
 This explains the adoption of ius soli, the distinction between 
nationals and citizens, the limited possible routes to naturalisation and the restrictions on political 
rights of representation for those who naturalised. These four elements perfectly suited the needs of 
the ruling elites in the new republics, and in Brazil. These legislative choices cannot be considered 
legal transplants since in many respects they were a continuation of the previous framework and 
practices. In other words, concepts and institutions that had already been in place were replicated and 
adapted to the postcolonial reality in which the new countries faced similar challenges. In any case, it 
is important to stress that other constitutional models (mainly from the USA, England and France) 
were also important in early South American constitutionalism.
164
 However, it was the Cádiz example 
that most affected our present subject of study. 
By contrast, the closed borders, long residence periods before naturalisation and limited rights for 
foreigners worked against the hope of attracting European settlers to populate large territories. They 
were also self-defeating when it came to open trade in global markets, something that had not been 
possible under the Spanish Crown’s monopoly. The race to attract migrants resulted in clauses 
granting equal treatment and short-term residence periods before naturalisation. Any other strategy 
would have been counterproductive. Here we can refer to legal transplants as playing a crucial role in 
South America through a process of emulation.
165
 The legislators were, of course, aware of how other 
countries in the region were dealing with the matter. At least from the 1830s onwards, national 
representatives often met in regional congresses and were also in contact through links forged in, for 
instance, London, Paris or New York, and through transnational networks of newspapers. Knowledge 
of foreign rule is of central importance for successful transplantation.
166
 Open borders is the best 
example of this. The phrase ‘any foreigner of any nation will be welcomed to the territory,’ first used 
in the 1811 Venezuelan Constitution, was then copied verbatim by various other countries. 
More interestingly, the countries that first adopted more restrictive conditions were forced to 
liberalise their immigration laws in a process of strategic adjustment
167
 so as not to be left behind in 
this race for migrants. For example, Peru and Ecuador – which in their first constitutions did not grant 
extensive rights to foreigners and stipulated long residence periods before naturalisation
168
 – changed 
their laws to make them more appealing. Consequently, diffusion and legal transplants became normal 
at the regional level. The 1821 Colombian Constitution played an important role. This constitution 
covered the territory of what was then known as Gran Colombia, which also included present-day 
Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela. Moreover, Simón Bolivar and other important independence heroes 
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participated in the Congress of Cúcuta, at which the final text was drafted. Earlier failed constitutions, 
such as the 1811 Venezuelan one, also had a clear influence. This aligns with the findings of other 
authors who have pointed out that “[c]ountries with similar levels of power often model their policies 
after each other reciprocally, in a process of iterative emulation.”169  
Path Dependency in South America’s Legal Construction of the Foreigner and the National 
Persistent central elements in the relationship between the national and the foreigner through 200 years 
of constitutional practice merit our attention. Once again, the work of Alan Watson is illuminating 
here. Watson argues that not only most legal change takes place through transplantation but, most 
decisively, longevity of the law is the general rule and that “to a large extent law possesses a life and 
vitality of its own” despite “changes in societal structure.”170 In his view, several countervailing forces 
determine whether legal change takes place or not. There are forces working in favour of change 
(“pressure forces”), and ones resisting any alteration. However, since order and stability is essentially 
society’s stake in the law,171 and since “the ruling elite have a generalised interest in no change,” the 
pressure forces must be much stronger than the opposition ones for transformation to take place.
172
 In 
the political science literature, this has been analysed within the framework of path dependency 
theories designed to explain how history matters.
173
 This is a framework that we can apply to some of 
the elements in the case at hand. 
In Gargarella’s opinion, the two foundational ideas behind Latin America’s constitutionalism were 
“individual autonomy” and “collective self-government.”174 The two notions lie at the core of the 
division between nationals, citizens and foreigners and of the rights that pertain to each category, 
including political ones. Gargarella points out that three different approaches have been prevalent 
since independence: conservative, republican and liberal.
175
 In his view, the dominant force has been 
an alliance between the liberal and the conservative projects, as reflected in two centuries of 
constitutional practice.
176
 The conservative paradigm “implied a commitment to two theoretical 
positions of enormous importance in America, namely political elitism and moral perfectionism.”177 
The liberal approach had a “double commitment to the equilibrium of powers and the state’s moral 
neutrality,” which was based on the value of “individual autonomy.”178 This opposed the “moral 
perfectionism” of the conservatives, notably their “vocation to organize society around the demands of 
a particular religion,” and also contrasted with them in proposing a “list of individual, inviolable, and 
unconditional rights” since conservatives “made rights dependent on the needs of religion.”179 
According to Gargarella, both sides – being elitist – were mostly concerned with, and agreed upon, 
preventing the expropriation of property and the rise of more radical governments based on an 
extended franchise. Consequently, the two tendencies were combined in a liberal-conservative 
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alliance. This led to the “formula of limited political liberties and ample civic (economic) liberties.” 
This architecture was diffused, gained stability and remained “basically the same” for 150 years.180  
This explains why the two projects fundamentally agreed on the construction of the national, the 
citizen and the foreigner. For example, the liberals and the conservatives shared views on limiting the 
extension of citizenship and its corresponding political rights through legal devices such as property, 
literacy or economic requirements.
181
 They also agreed on the idea of limiting access to political 
positions for newly naturalised individuals. At the same time, economic development was then 
understood to be a consequence of migration, larger populations and entrance into world trade 
markets. Both the liberals and the conservatives agreed on this and shared the image of the ideal 
migrant as a white European male with property, capital or knowledge.  
As a result, significant digressions from this approach were by and large absent during the 
nineteenth century. One exception was the adoption of the 1886 Colombian Constitution. This 
document, which was considered to be very conservative, was approved in a highly specific context of 
economic struggles and internal and external conflicts. This ended a very liberal period, epitomised by 
the 1863 Constitution.
182
 The conservative character of the 1886 text is evident from its limitations on 
access to citizenship, its reduction of the rights of naturalised citizens and of foreigners’ rights in 
general. Most importantly, the 1886 Colombian Constitution ended the absolute ius soli tradition in the 
country, which makes Colombia an outlier in the region.  
Importantly, however, although central features such as ius soli have continued until today, the 
figure of the foreigner was later deconstructed during the twentieth century. From the 1880s, South 
American laws began to associate the foreigner with criminality, political subversiveness, idleness, 
labour market competition and immorality. Through this process, the foreigner was portrayed as a 
threat to how the members of the elite imagined the nation, either because of individual traits – e.g. 
political ideas, age and health – or because of collective national, racial or ethnic constructions – e.g. 
the exclusion of Asians, blacks, Roma or Jews. The twentieth century is not discussed here, but those 
interested can refer to Chapter 4 of the forthcoming book on which this working paper is based.
183
 
Conclusion 
During the nineteenth century, the construction of the national, the citizen and the foreigner was a 
complex social and legal process. The 1812 Cádiz Constitution profoundly influenced this 
construction, as did the early constitutional texts in Colombia and Venezuela, which emphasised open 
borders, equal treatment and short residence periods before naturalising. The immigration project was 
intended to address not only concerns regarding the size and distribution of the population, but also to 
contribute to the whitening of local populations and the segregation of indigenous groups. In the 
nineteenth century, the elite used migration and citizenship policies as tools to define nationhood. As 
López Alves states, “weak states in formation struggled to link institutions of government with 
heterogeneous populations that were lumped together under the label of a ‘one and unifying nation’ in 
the context of strong international pressures.”184 The commonality of interests between the liberal and 
conservative elites was thus crucial in providing continuity and stability to the legal regulation of the 
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national, the citizen and the foreigner. This was necessary to preserve the colonial social order that 
privileged a miniscule minority of the population. The elite’s vision was one of a gradual 
transformation of society, rather than a radical rupture with the previous colonial order, with the 
exclusion of the indigenous and black populations, mainly from political rights. This created new 
boundaries in the slow process of creating national communities.  
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